Ultra-Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol with Substitution Operation by Salour, Al et al.
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Scholars' Mine 
Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty 
Research & Creative Works Electrical and Computer Engineering 
05 Feb 2019 
Ultra-Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol with 
Substitution Operation 
Al Salour 
Douglas D. Trimble 
Jagannathan Sarangapani 
Missouri University of Science and Technology, sarangap@mst.edu 
Eyad S. Taqieddin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/ele_comeng_facwork 
 Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
A. Salour et al., "Ultra-Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol with Substitution Operation," U.S. 
Patents, Feb 2019. 
This Patent is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty Research & Creative Works by an authorized administrator of Scholars' 
Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution 
requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu. 
US010198605B1 
( 12 ) United States Patent 
Salour et al . 
( 10 ) Patent No . : US 10 , 198 , 605 B1 
( 45 ) Date of Patent : Feb . 5 , 2019 
( 54 ) ULTRA - LIGHTWEIGHT MUTUAL 
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL WITH 
SUBSTITUTION OPERATION 
8 , 332 , 645 B2 
8 , 412 , 937 B2 * . . . . . 
2008 / 0025496 A1 * Smith 
2008 / 0106386 A1 * ( 71 ) Applicants : The Boeing Company , Chicago , IL ( US ) ; Missouri University of Science 
and Technology , Rolla , MO ( US ) 
12 / 2012 Dolev et al . 
4 / 2013 Maubach HO4L 9 / 0844 
713 / 168 
1 / 2008 Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GO6F 21 / 64 
380 / 28 5 / 2008 Li . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H04L 63 / 0492 
340 / 10 . 5 1 / 2010 Eom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GO6K 7 / 0008 
340 / 10 . 1 
5 / 2011 Canard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H04L 9 / 3271 
713 / 170 
2010 / 0019883 Al * 
2011 / 0107102 Al * ( 72 ) Inventors : Ali Salour , Fenton , MO ( US ) ; Douglas 
D . Trimble , Saint Peters , MO ( US ) ; Jagannathan Sarangapani , Rolla , MO 
( US ) ; Eyad S . Taqieddin , Irbid ( JO ) 
( 73 ) Assignees : The Boeing Company , Chicago , IL 
( US ) ; Missouri University of Science 
and Technology , Rolla , MO ( US ) 
( * ) Notice : Subject to any disclaimer , the term of this 
patent is extended or adjusted under 35 
U . S . C . 154 ( b ) by 452 days . 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
Wikipedia , Substitution - Permutation network , Jan . 24 , 2010 , pp . 
1 - 2 . * 
Adams et al . — The Structures Design of Cryptographically Good 
S - Boxes . * 
Ayoub Probabilistic Completeness of Substitution - Permutation 
Encryption Networks . * 
Baigneres et al . - Providing the Security of AES Substitution 
Permutation Network . * 
Mar et al . — New Analysis Methods on Strict Avalanche Criterion of 
S - Boxes . * 
Wang Shao - hui et al . , " Security Analysis of RAPP : An RFID 
Authentication Protocol based on Permulation , " http : / / eprint . iacr . 
org / 2012 / 327 . pdf . 
( Continued ) 
( 21 ) Appl . No . : 13 / 857 , 125 
( 22 ) Filed : Apr . 4 , 2013 
( 51 ) Int . Ci . 
H040 5 / 22 ( 2006 . 01 ) 
G06K 7 / 10 ( 2006 . 01 ) ( 52 ) U . S . CI . 
CPC . . . . . . . . . . . GO6K 7 / 10297 ( 2013 . 01 ) 
( 58 ) Field of Classification Search 
USPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 / 10 . 5 
See application file for complete search history . 
Primary Examiner – Quang Pham 
( 74 ) Attorney , Agent , or Firm — Miller , Matthias & Hull 
LLP 
( 56 ) References Cited 
U . S . PATENT DOCUMENTS 
( 57 ) ABSTRACT 
A method comprises using at least one of a reader and a 
passive tag to exchange values according to an ultra - light 
weight mutual authentication protocol with a substitution 
operation to change a Hamming weight of the values . 7 , 450 , 010 B1 * 11 / 2008 Gravelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . GO6F 21 / 606 340 / 572 . 1 
7 , 515 , 901 B1 * 4 / 2009 Kaundinya . . . . . . . . . G06Q 10 / 08 
380 / 247 20 Claims , 4 Drawing Sheets 
110 
- - - - - - - - - RFID SYSTEM - - 
- 
130 - 120 - 
RFID READER - PASSIVE RFID 
DEVICE - 
- 
r 140 - 



































- - - - - - - - - 
- - - 
US 10 , 198 , 605 B1 
Page 2 
( 56 ) References Cited 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
R . K . Pateriya , “ An Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Proto 
col for Low Cost RFID Tags , ” International Journal of Computer 
Applications ( 0975 - 8887 ) , vol . 25 — No . 10 , Jul . 2011 . 
Yung - Cheng Lee , “ Two Ultralightweight Authentication Protocols 
for LowCost RFID Tags , ” Appl . Math . Inf . Sci . 6 No . 28 pp . 
425S - 431S ( 2012 ) 
* cited by examiner 
atent Feb . 5 , 2019 Sheet 1 of 4 US 10 , 198 , 605 B1 
FIG . 1 110 
???? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ?? ?? ??? | RFID SYSTEM 
- 
sessions 
- 130 120 - 
RFID READER - PASSIVE RFID 
DEVICE - se 
serveis 140 - 
— 132 PROCESSOR 122 PROCESSOR - 
www 
- 
ws - 124 

















atent Feb . 5 , 2019 Sheet 2 of 4 US 10 , 198 , 605 B1 
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FIG . 3 
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ULTRA - LIGHTWEIGHT MUTUAL FIG . 2 is an illustration of a communication method 
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL WITH according to an ultra - lightweight mutual authentication pro 
SUBSTITUTION OPERATION tocol with substitution and permutation operations . 
FIG . 3 is an illustration of a communication method BACKGROUND 5 according to an ultra - lightweight mutual authentication pro 
Radio Frequency Identification ( RFID ) systems may be tocol with substitution and permutation operations . 
passive or active . In a passive RFID system , a passive RFID FIG . 4 is an illustration of an aircraft delivery center . 
tag harvests incident power from an RFID reader to run its 
circuitry , which transmits information back to the reader . DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The transmitted information may include unique identifying 
information about an asset being tracked , controlled , or Reference is made to FIG . 1 , which illustrates an RFID 
managed . system 110 including an RFID reader 120 and a passive 
In certain RFID systems , protecting the privacy of certain RFID device 130 . The reader 120 may include circuitry such 
transmitted information is desirable . However , standard as a processor 122 , a transceiver 124 , an antenna 126 , and 
cryptographic protocols for authentication and privacy are 15 machine - readable memory 128 . The memory 128 is encoded not viable due to limited computational capabilities and with data that , when executed , causes the reader 120 to emit constrained energy reserves of the passive tags . a magnetic field that provides operating power to the passive A certain measure of privacy may be afforded by an 
ultra - lightweight protocol . A protocol such as a lightweight RFID device 130 . The executed data may also cause the 
mutual authentication protocol ( LMAP ) employs simple 20 reader 120 to communicate with the passive device 130 and 
bitwise and bit - shift operations , such as AND , OR and XOR . record its observations to a secure database 140 or other 
An ultra - lightweight protocol such as Strong Authentication computer system 140 . 
and Strong Integrity ( SASI ) increases the weak security The passive device 130 may include circuitry such as a 
afforded by simple bitwise operations by adding a rotation processor 132 , a transceiver 134 , an antenna 136 , and 
operation . However , encryption strength is still relatively 25 machine - readable memory 138 , which may be non - volatile . 
weak . Operating power for running the device circuitry may be Moreover , SASI and other ultra - lightweight protocols are harvested from the magnetic field . The memory 138 is 
vulnerable to full disclosure and de - synchronization attacks . encoded with data that , when executed , causes the passive In a full disclosure attack , an attacker exploits certain device 130 to transmit information back to the reader 120 . vulnerabilities in the protocol to determine secret keys and 30 The information , which is also stored in the memory 138 , other secret information stored in a tag . In a de - synchroni 
zation attack , an intruder is not necessarily interested in may include secret information , ( e . g . , an ID or other unique 
knowing the secret information . Rather , the intruder ' s goal identifying information about an asset ) and non - secret infor 
is to manipulate the system such that the secret keys between mation ( e . g . , a field for cyclic redundancy check ) . The secret 
the tag and the reader are not mutually updated . This form information is encrypted before it is transmitted . 
of attack leads to a denial of service because the reader will 35 Unlike the reader 120 , the passive device 130 has limited 
not be able to properly authenticate the tag or vice versa . computational capabilities and constrained energy reserves . 
It is desirable to improve upon ultra - lightweight protocols For instance , the harvested power enables the passive device 
to increase encryption strength and also to thwart full 130 to operate for only several ( e . g . , tens of ) milliseconds to 
disclosure and de - synchronization attacks . perform and complete a communication session with the 
40 reader 120 . Due to the limited computational capabilities 
SUMMARY and constrained energy reserves of the passive device 130 , 
standard cryptographic protocols for authentication and pri 
According to an embodiment herein , a method comprises mprises vacy are not viable . 
using at least one of a passive tag and a reader to exchange To protect privacy of the secret information , the reader 
values according to an ultra - lightweight mutual authentica - 45 120 entica - 45 120 and the passive device 130 perform information tion protocol with a substitution operation to change a exchanges according to an ultra - lightweight mutual authen Hamming weight of the values . tication protocol with a substitution operation . The substi According to another embodiment herein , a communica tution operation changes a Hamming weight of values being tions device comprises a processor and memory encoded 
exchanged , whereby the number of l ’ s and O ' s in the values with data for causing the processor to perform information 
exchanges with another communications device according 30 15 ng 50 is changed . Changing the Hamming weight increases 
to an ultra - lightweight mutual authentication protocol with a encryption strength over an ultra - lightweight protocol such 
substitution operation . as Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity ( SASI ) . 
According to another embodiment herein , an article com The substitution operation may be performed in combi 
prises computer - readable memory encoded with data for nation with a weak encryption method that changes posi 
causing an RFID device to exchange values with another 55 tions of the bits in a message . Examples of the weak 
RFID device according to an ultra - lightweight mutual encryption method include , but are not limited to , a bitwise 
authentication protocol with substitution and permutation rotation , swap , or permutation . These operations do not 
operations . change the content of a message . The substitution operation , 
These features and functions may be achieved indepen - on the other hand , changes the content and conceals the 
dently in various embodiments or may be combined in other 60 original content . The combination of permutation and sub 
embodiments . Further details of the embodiments can be stitution operations can be performed within limited com 
seen with reference to the following description and draw - putational capabilities and constrained energy reserves of 
ings . the passive device 130 . 
A rotation operation may be performed instead of the 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 65 permutation operation . However , the permutation operation 
provides a better transposition of data . In the permutation 
FIG . 1 is an illustration of an RFID system . operation , bits of new positions cannot be easily guessed . 
US 10 , 198 , 605 B1 
The permutation operation is not limited to anything in 120 and the passive device 130 according to UMAP - SP . The 
particular , so long as the reader 120 and the passive device passive device 130 stores a current key set . The reader 120 
130 use the same operation . In some embodiments , a keyed has access ( e . g . , via the database 140 ) to a current key set 
permutation operation may be used , where the permutation that is associated with the passive device 130 . 
function depends on a value of a key . In some embodiments , 5 At block 210 , the reader 120 initiates a communication 
the following keyed permutation may be used . For two n - bit session . For instance , the reader emits a magnetic field 
strings , X and Y , in the form containing a message . If the passive device 130 is within 
X = x1x2 . . . Xn , x ; € { 0 , 1 } , i = 1 , 2 , . . . , n range of the reader 120 , the magnetic field will provide operational power to the passive device 130 . In response to 
Y = y?y2 . . . Yn y : { 0 , 1 } , i = 1 , 2 , . . . , 10 the message , the passive device 120 sends an acknowledge 
ment ( e . g . , an index associated with that device 130 ) to the If the Hamming weight of Y , wt ( Y ) , is m ( Osmsn ) and reader 120 . 
Yk? FYk2 = . . . = ykn = 1 At block 220 , the reader 120 uses the acknowledgement 
to access the current key set that is associated with that 
Ykm + 1 Þykm + 2 = . . . = Yx = 0 15 passive device 130 . For instance , the reader 120 accesses the 
key set from the database 140 . 
where At block 230 , the passive device 130 and the reader 120 
use their respective key sets to perform mutual authentica 1skiskas . . . Skmsn tion and then to generate new sets of keys . Permutation and 
20 substitution operations are performed during mutual authen and 
tication and new key generation . 
1skm + 15km + 25 . . . sk , sn If the mutual authentication is not successful ( block 240 ) , the reader 120 and the passive device 130 revert to their then , the permutation of X according to Y is current key sets ( block 250 ) . If mutual authentication is 
Per ( X , Y ) = Xkpotky . . . key they taken - 1 . Kkm + 2 + km = 1 25 successful ( block 240 ) , the reader 120 and the passive device 
The substitution operation is not limited to anything in 130 update their key sets with the new set of keys for future 
authentication ( block 260 ) . particular , provided that both sides perform the same map 
ping . To limit the computations and power consumption , a The method of FIG . 2 enables secure communications to 
single substitution box ( " S - Box ” ) may be used to map the be performed in a low power environment with limited 
values ( each input value is replaced by a different one using 30 30 computational capability and limited session time . As will 
a lookup table ) . In some embodiments , the following sub be demonstrated below , as few as five exchanges may be 
stitution operation may be used . Let map be the substi ati performed to authenticate and encrypt . The method of FIG . 2 increases encryption strength , as tution of the value x by a value in the table whose index is 
mod / index ( x ) + r , 16 ) . For two n - bit strings , X and Y , in the the combination of permutation and substitution is stronger 
form 35 than simple bitwise operations . The method of FIG . 2 can prevent de - synchronization and full disclosure attacks . The 
X = X1X2 . . . Xn , x ; € { 0 , 1 } , i = 1 , 2 , . . . , N set of keys in the passive device changes with each round of 
authentication , but only if the authentication is successful . 
Y = y?y2 . . . Yn y ; € { 0 , 1 } , i = 1 , 2 , . . . , N Reference is now made to FIG . 3 , which illustrates a 
then 40 communications method in which only five exchanges 
between the reader 120 and passive device 130 are needed 
to authenticate and encrypt . On the device side , the passive 
device 130 stores its secret key set K1 and K2 and other Sub ( X , Y ) = 
secret information including its identifier ID . In this embodi 
45 ment , the passive device 130 does not have computational 
where | | is a concatenation operation , and power to generate random numbers . On the reader side , the database 140 stores information 
Yx = ly4k + 1 » Y4k + 23Y4k + 3 ; Y 4k + 4 ) about the passive device 130 , including its secret key set K1 , 
and K2 , and its identifier ID . The subscript " r " denotes 
* * = \ x 4k + 1 » ¥4k + 2 ,44k + 3 , 44k + 4 ! 50 information on the reader side , which may be different than 
The RFID system 110 may include additional devices , the corresponding information on the device side . The 
both active and passive ( not shown ) . The reader 120 may database 140 may also store information about any addi 
have sufficient computational capabilities and constrained tional passive devices . 
energy reserves to communicate with multiple devices Communication begins with first and second exchanges . 
simultaneously and to communicate with the database 140 . 55 The reader 120 broadcasts a message such as " Hello " ( block 
The reader 120 may communicate with additional passive 310 ) . If the passive device 130 is within range of the reader 
devices according to an ultra - lightweight mutual authenti - 120 , it responds by sending an index pseudonym ( IDS ) to 
cation protocol with substitution and permutation operations the reader 120 ( block 320 ) . The IDS points to an entry in the 
( UMAP - SP ) . The reader 120 may communicate with addi - database 140 , which contains information about the passive 
tional active devices according to UMAP - SP or another 60 device 130 . The IDS may be dynamic . The device ' s ID is 
protocol that is more computationally intensive . kept secret and is not sent at this point . 
The RFID system 110 may also include additional readers . The reader 120 uses the IDS to access the secret infor 
( not shown ) that have access to the database 140 . Each mation about the passive device 130 , including the secret 
additional reader may communicate with the passive device key set K1 , and K2 , and the identifier ID , ( block 325 ) . At 
120 and any additional RFID devices . 65 this point , the reader 120 would not accept the identity of the 
Additional reference is made to FIG . 2 , which illustrates passive device 130 because it has no guarantee that the IDS 
a high - level communication method performed by the reader came from an authentic passive device 130 . 
yo 
map ( x ) " yi map x ) Il . . . Il map ( x ) , K 
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The reader 120 and the passive device 130 then exchange The reader 120 receives the fourth message D , and then 
random numbers and perform reader authentication ( third generates a new reader - side IDS * , and key set K1 * , and 
exchange ) . In the embodiment of FIG . 3 , two random K2 * , ( block 360 ) . The new IDS * , , and key set K1 * , and K2 * , 
numbers n , and n , are exchanged . These random numbers ni may generated as follows : 
and n , will be used for mutual authentication and generation 5 
of new key sets . K1 , * = Per ( Sub ( K2 , n2 ) , n? ) 
In some embodiments , the reader 120 generates three 
messages A , B and C and sends the messages to the passive K2 , * = Per ( Sub ( K1 , * , n1 ) , n2 ) device 130 ( block 330 ) . The messages A , B and C may be 
generated using permutation and substitution operations as 10 IDS , * = Per ( Sub ( n 1 , K2 , * ) , K1 , * ) follows : The reader 120 then recreates the fourth message D , 
A = Per - ' ( Sub - ' ( n? , K1 , ) , K2 , ) ( block 360 ) . The reader 120 may recreate the fourth message 
D , as follows : 
B = Per - ' ( Sub - ' ( n2 , K2 , ) , K1 , ) 15 D = Per ( Sub ( ID , K1 , * ) , K2 , * ) 
C = Per ( Sub ( ID „ n? ) , ny ) If D = D . , then the passive device 130 is authenticated to 
where Per - 1 and Sub - 1 are inverse permutation and substi - the reader 120 . A new key set K1 , * and K2 , * and a new 
tution operations . The first and second messages A and B are index pseudonym IDS , * are generated , and the new key set 
used to transmit the random numbers n , and n , . The third 20 K1 , * and K2 , * is stored in the database 140 at the location 
message C will be used for reader authentication . indicated by IDS , * . As a result , the reader 120 will maintain 
The reason for using the inverse operation on the reader two sets of the index and keys . For a subsequent authenti 
side is due to the limited computational capabilities of the cation session , the reader 120 determines which set to use 
passive device 130 . The substitution and permutation opera - based on the received IDS ( either IDS , or IDS , * ) . 
tions are done only in the forward direction on the device 25 If D = D , , the key set update is then confirmed ( fifth 
side , whereas the reader 120 , which has far greater compu - exchange ) . The reader 120 sends a fifth message E to the 
tational resources , can perform both the forward and back - passive device , where E = IDS * , ( block 370 ) . The fifth mes 
ward ( inverse ) directions of substitution and permutation . sage E may instead be another message that is a function of 
In other embodiments , however , the device 130 may be the new keys , but message E = IDS * , avoids giving an 
built with an inverse substitution and an inverse permuta - 30 attacker multiple cipher texts . 
tion . In those embodiments , the messages A and B may be If E = IDS * , then the key set on the reader side is the same 
generated with substitution and permutation operations as the key set on the device side . Therefore , the passive 
The passive device 130 then uses its key set K1 and K2 device 130 replaces the old key set K1 and K2 with the new 
to retrieve the random numbers n , and n , from messages A key set K1 * and K2 * so it can thereafter use the new key set 
and B ( block 340 ) . The random numbers n , and n , may be 35 as the valid set between it and the reader 120 ( block 380 ) . 
retrieved as follows : The reader 120 should now expect the passive device 130 to 
use the new key set in the next authentication session . If , for 
ni = Sub ( Per ( B , K2 ) , K1 ) any reason , the passive device 130 responds at the beginning 
of the new session with the old index pseudonym IDS , then 
n2 = Sub ( Per ( B , K1 ) , K2 ) 40 the reader 120 can tell that the previous authentication 
The passive device 130 then uses the random numbers n session was not successful . If , however , the reader 120 
and n , and its ID to generate the third message C ' , which is receives the new index pseudonym IDS * , then that confirms 
then compared to the message C sent by the reader ( block to the reader 120 that no messages were lost during the 
340 ) . If C = C ' , then the reader 120 is authenticated to the previous authentication session . Thus , by maintaining the 
passive device 130 . The passive device 130 may generate 45 old and new sets of keys , the reader 120 avoids the risk of 
the third message C ' as follows : de - synchronization . 
If the passive device 130 never receives the fifth message 
C ' = Per ( Sub ( ID , n? ) , n2 ) E ( for instance , due to malicious or innocuous events ) , it will 
If the reader 120 is authenticated . IDS and key set updates retain the old key set K1 and K2 and will not update to the 
are performed ( fourth exchange ) . Using the random num - 50 new key set K1 " and K2 * . 
bers n , and n , and its key set K1 and K2 , the passive device The method of FIG . 3 offers advantages other than 
130 generates a new IDS * and a new key set K1 * and K2 * increasing encryption strength and thwarting full disclosure 
( block 350 ) . The new IDS * and new key set K1 * and K2 * and de - synchronization attacks . The method offers forward 
may generated as follows : security . The goal of forward security is to guarantee that a 
disclosure of the secrets at any time will not lead to 
K1 * = Per ( Sub ( K2 , n2 ) , n? ) disclosing all previous communications . Since the new set 
of keys depends on random numbers , which are not known 
K2 * = Per ( Sub ( K ) * , n? ) , n2 ) to the attacker , the attacker will not be able to disclose the 
previous sets of keys and will only be able to reveal the 
IDS * = Per ( Sub ( n1 , K2 * ) , K * ) 60 current and all subsequent messages . 
The passive device 130 also generates a fourth message D The method includes a double key confirmation , which 
and sends that message D to the reader 120 ( block 350 ) . This enables the reader 120 to implicitly determine whether the 
fourth message D will be used for authentication of the last update was successful . The method also includes a 
passive device 130 to the reader 120 . The fourth message D double key update , which mitigates the effect of replayed 65 messages , which can occur during replay attacks . may be generated as follows : The method of FIG . 3 may instead use multiple rounds for 
D = Per ( Sub ( ID , K * ) , K _ * ) computing the secret keys . For example , permute - substitute 
US 10 , 198 , 605 B1 
permute - substitute ( P - S - P - S ) may increase security , but also current reader - side key set associated with the passive tag ; 
increases the total number of computations . and wherein during a communication session , the passive 
A method herein is not limited to two secret keys and two tag and the reader use their respective key sets to perform 
random numbers . More than two keys and random numbers mutual authentication and then to generate new sets of keys , 
may be used to add to the complexity in case an intruder 5 the permutation and substitution operations performed dur 
attempts to perform a brute force attack , but at the expense ing the mutual authentication and new key generation . 
of more storage on both the reader and the passive device . 7 . The method of claim 6 , wherein the reader and the A method herein is not limited to RFID systems . It may ay passive tag each generates its own new key set using shared be applied to other systems including readers and tags . 
random numbers . A method herein is not limited to any particular applica - 10 8 . The method of claim 6 , wherein the current key sets are tion . Examples include , but are not limited to , asset man used to authenticate the reader to the passive tag , and the agement , supply chain management , and the management of 
finance data and credit information . new key sets are used to authenticate the passive tag to the 
Consider the case of asset management , where different reader . 
parties have assets ( e . g . , tools , parts ) located in a building . 15 9 . The method of claim 6 , wherein if the mutual authen 
A method herein would allow one party to send and receive tication is not successful , the passive tag reverts to its current data without sharing the data with the other parties in the key set ; otherwise , the passive tag updates its key set with 
building . the new set of keys for future authentication . 
Even if assets are controlled entirely by a single party at 10 . The method of claim 9 , wherein the reader maintains 
a single site , a method herein may be used to protect those 20 its current and new key sets even if the mutual authentication 
assets from intruders . For instance , assets are managed on a is successful . 
site that is adjacent to property that is publicly owned or 11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the reader deter 
owned by another party . A method herein can thwart intrud - mines which key set to use based on a received index 
ers from receiving secret information via commercially pseudonym ( IDS ) from the passive tag . 
available readers on the adjacent property . 25 12 . The method of claim 6 , wherein a first exchange 
Reference is now made to FIG . 4 . One particular example between the reader and the passive tag is initiated by the 
of asset management involves an aircraft delivery center reader , wherein the passive tag responds with a second 
410 . The aircraft delivery center 410 includes a plurality of exchange by sending an index pseudonym ( IDS ) to the 
aircraft stalls 420 and a plurality of buildings 430 . Located reader , and wherein the reader uses the IDS to access its key 
within the delivery center 410 are assets including , but not 30 set associated with the passive tag . 
limited to , aircraft , ground support equipment , test equip - 13 . The method of claim 12 , wherein a third exchange 
ment and tools . Some or all of these assets may be tagged between the reader and the passive tag is performed , with the 
with passive RFID devices . RFID readers may be located in reader generating random numbers , creating encrypted mes 
each aircraft stall . For instance , RFID readers may be sages from the random numbers and identifier ( ID ) using its 
installed on poles or attached to light posts . RFID readers 35 current key set , and sending the messages to the passive tag , 
may also be located on top of small buildings 430 . which uses its current key set to recover the random numbers 
The aircraft delivery center 410 may be owned by a and authenticate the reader to the passive tag . 
company . However , the delivery center 410 is adjacent to 14 . The method of claim 13 , wherein the reader generates 
land that is not owned by that company . In the example of the messages using inverse substitution and inverse permu 
FIG . 4 , the aircraft delivery center 410 is adjacent to public 40 tation so that the passive tag performs the substitution and 
property ( e . g . , roads and public parking ) 440 and an airport permutation only in a forward direction . 
450 . The airport 450 is where test flights are performed by 15 . The method of claim 13 , wherein a fourth exchange 
company pilots prior to delivery to airline carriers . To between the reader and the passive tag is performed , wherein 
protect the privacy of the assets , the passive RFID devices the reader generates a new key set and IDS using the 
may communicate with the readers in accordance with a 45 reader - side current key set and ID ; and wherein the passive 
method herein . tag generates a new key set and IDS using the device - side 
The invention claimed is : current key set and ID . 
1 . A method comprising using at least one of a reader and 16 . The method of claim 15 , wherein a fifth exchange 
a passive tag to exchange values according to an ultra - confirms the passive tag to the reader , wherein the reader 
lightweight mutual authentication protocol with a substitu - 50 saves the new key set and IDS and sends a confirmation 
tion operation , the substitution operation being performed message to the passive tag . 
during each mutual authentication and changing a Hamming 17 . The method of claim 16 , wherein the passive tag 
weight of each of the values exchanged . updates its key set if and only if it receives the confirmation 
2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the reader is an RFID message . 
reader and wherein the passive tag is a passive RFID device . 55 18 . A communications device comprising a processor and 
3 . The method of claim 2 , wherein a weak encryption memory encoded with data for causing the processor to 
operation is used in combination with the substitution opera - perform information exchanges with another communica 
tion ; and wherein the passive tag performs the substitution tions device according to an ultra - lightweight mutual 
operation only in a forward direction and the RFID reader authentication protocol with a substitution operation , the 
performs the substitution operation in both forward and 60 substitution operation being performed during each mutual 
backward directions . authentication and changing a Hamming weight of each of 
4 . The method of claim 3 , wherein the weak encryption the values exchanged . 
operation includes a permutation operation . 19 . An article comprising computer - readable memory 
5 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the permutation encoded with data for causing an RFID device to exchange 
operation is a keyed permutation operation . 65 values with another RFID device according to an ultra 
6 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the passive tag stores lightweight mutual authentication protocol with substitution 
a current device - side key set , and the reader accesses a and permutation operations , the substitution operation being 
US 10 , 198 , 605 B1 
performed during each mutual authentication and changing 
a Hamming weight of each of the values exchanged . 
20 . The article of claim 19 , wherein the data further 
causes the RFID device to function as a passive RFID tag . 
